Re: password_encryption default

Поиск
Список
Период
Сортировка
От Jonathan S. Katz
Тема Re: password_encryption default
Дата
Msg-id 3c6509e5-1d3d-423f-08b5-fc50df89c9e6@postgresql.org
обсуждение исходный текст
Ответ на Re: password_encryption default  (Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>)
Ответы Re: password_encryption default  (Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>)
Список pgsql-hackers
On 5/25/20 5:45 AM, Peter Eisentraut wrote:
> On 2020-05-22 23:23, Jonathan S. Katz wrote:
>>> Yeah.  But there's still something to Jonathan's argument, because 9.6
>>> will go EOL in November 2021, which is pretty close to when v14 will
>>> reach public release (assuming we can hold to the typical schedule).
>>> If we do it in v13, there'll be a full year where still-supported
>>> versions of PG can't do SCRAM, implying that clients would likely
>>> fail to connect to an up-to-date server.
>>
>> ^ that's what I meant.
>
> Here is a proposed patch for PG14 then.

This makes me happy :D

I took a look over, it looks good. One question on the initdb.c diff:

-    if (strcmp(authmethodlocal, "scram-sha-256") == 0 ||
-        strcmp(authmethodhost, "scram-sha-256") == 0)
-    {
-        conflines = replace_token(conflines,
-                                  "#password_encryption = md5",
-                                  "password_encryption = scram-sha-256");
-    }
-

Would we reverse this, i.e. if someone chooses authmethodlocal to be
"md5", we would then set "password_encryption = md5"?

Thanks,

Jonathan


Вложения

В списке pgsql-hackers по дате отправления:

Предыдущее
От: Justin Pryzby
Дата:
Сообщение: Re: Failure to create GiST on ltree column
Следующее
От: Vik Fearing
Дата:
Сообщение: Re: Since '2001-09-09 01:46:40'::timestamp microseconds are lost whenextracting epoch