Обсуждение: user-defined default public acl
Dear hackers, I'm used to have a "umask 077", but I cannot have that at the time with postgresql. This fact is among the many various "surprises" I had while discovering postgresql, and this is easy to fix. Thus I'd like to add a user defined default public acl for postgresql database, namespace, class, language and proc, instead of the hardwired defaults in "src/backend/utils/adt/acl.c". In order to do so I'm planing to add 5 new user-land pg_settings intended to describe the default rights for "public" on new objects: - database_default_acl - namespace_default_acl - class_default_acl - language_default_acl - proc_default_acl The default for these would be postgresql current defaults for public acl. The value could be integer (binary) or string (symbolic). I think that the use of a string version would be more useful:proc_default_acl = "x". Any comments? Also, I'm afraid that empty acl arrays (from what is seen from acl fields when dumping pg_database or other tables) have a meaning at the time, which is "default"... this may interact with new user-defined defaults. I think that it would be appropriate to have defaults set at object creation time, so that "default" would mean "no acl", thus only super users would be able to access such objects? Or am I missing something on this point?? That's quite possible. -- Fabien Coelho - coelho@cri.ensmp.fr
Fabien COELHO <coelho@cri.ensmp.fr> writes:
> Thus I'd like to add a user defined default public acl for postgresql
> database, namespace, class, language and proc, instead of the hardwired
> defaults in "src/backend/utils/adt/acl.c".
I'm unconvinced that this is a good idea. In the first place I am
unsure what sorts of surprising behaviors might result from
nontraditional defaults for these ACL settings. (I find the precedent
of "umask 077" unconvincing because a Unix filesystem only deals with
two kinds of objects, files and directories, with not-so-different
protection behaviors. I don't know that that scales up to SQL.)
> Also, I'm afraid that empty acl arrays (from what is seen from acl fields
> when dumping pg_database or other tables) have a meaning at the time,
> which is "default"... this may interact with new user-defined defaults.
Yup, it would, and that strikes me as another fertile place for problems.
You will have to make some basic changes in the way that default ACLs
are handled, or else such a feature would introduce security holes.
I'm not sure how much user-facing behavior would have to change, but
I doubt it could be a completely transparent change.
Another area to think about is the implications for pg_dump, and
especially the implications for reloading existing dump scripts.
If the postgresql.conf settings for default ACLs are nonstandard,
wouldn't that result in reloaded objects acquiring different ACLs
than they had before? Is that a good idea?
Before buying into all this, it would be nice to see a better rationale
than "this surprised me and it's easy to fix". The latter at least
is wrong.
regards, tom lane
<sorry, I resend this as I have not received it from the list, and it doesnot appear in the archives...> Dear Tom, > > defaults in "src/backend/utils/adt/acl.c". > > I'm unconvinced that this is a good idea. Hmmm. > In the first place I am unsure what sorts of surprising behaviors might > result from nontraditional defaults for these ACL settings. Sure, this should be thought of. > (I find the precedent of "umask 077" unconvincing because a Unix > filesystem only deals with two kinds of objects, files and directories, > with not-so-different protection behaviors. I don't know that that > scales up to SQL.) I wouldn't want default rights for different objects to be mixed. Also, it is about "public" rights, that is "other" wrt unix umask. "public" means anybody, and my opinion is that anybody should not be given anything implicitly. > > Also, I'm afraid that empty acl arrays (from what is seen from acl fields > > when dumping pg_database or other tables) have a meaning at the time, > > which is "default"... this may interact with new user-defined defaults. > > Yup, it would, and that strikes me as another fertile place for problems. > You will have to make some basic changes in the way that default ACLs > are handled, or else such a feature would introduce security holes. Sure. > I'm not sure how much user-facing behavior would have to change, but > I doubt it could be a completely transparent change. Should be investigated. > Another area to think about is the implications for pg_dump, and > especially the implications for reloading existing dump scripts. > If the postgresql.conf settings for default ACLs are nonstandard, > wouldn't that result in reloaded objects acquiring different ACLs > than they had before? Is that a good idea? Well, I thought that pg_dump/restore would restore anything, including ACL. However, if some assumptions are made about default ACL this may be an issue. > Before buying into all this, it would be nice to see a better rationale > than "this surprised me and it's easy to fix". The latter at least is > wrong. For the former, I mean that I'm used to create something that has "no rights" to other people by default. Then I give the rights I want, and if I don't give anything, then nothing is given by default. That's my idea of security by default. The current status with postgresql is that some rights are given by default, so I have to fix everything by hand with revoke (I'm pretty sure I'll forget something) and then grant what I want. I'll never grant anything to "public", but rather to some groups. As I can't and don't want to make all people share my point of view, I would need some parametrizable default setting, so that I can at least share my point of view with myself;-) Also maybe the default may be different and still hardwired for system stuffs. A still better fix for me would be that default public rights are the most restrictive, as some comments suggest it could be the case: case ACL_OBJECT_FUNCTION:/* Grant EXECUTE by default, for now */ ^^^^^^^world_default= ACL_EXECUTE; ... case ACL_OBJECT_LANGUAGE:/* Grant USAGE by default, for now */world_default = ACL_USAGE; The patch would be quick;-) Have a nice day, -- Fabien COELHO _ http://www.cri.ensmp.fr/~coelho _ Fabien.Coelho@ensmp.fr CRI-ENSMP, 35, rue Saint-Honoré, 77305 Fontainebleaucedex, France phone: (+33|0) 1 64 69 {voice: 48 52, fax: 47 09, standard: 47 08} ________ All opinionsexpressed here are mine _________
[ discussion re/ default state of minimal rights, as opposed to the more generous situation today snipped ] Just to add fuel to the fire, as an ex-college sys-admin having had to deploy both Oracle and postgres, I would have to say that Oracle allowed me to deploy a database container shared by many many students relatively securely, while at the same time allowing them to perform cross-schema queries to their teammates tables if and when they needed to. The users could manage the ACLs of their own schema objects, allowing their peers into their tables on a mutual need basis, but the default action was to be closed off completely. Combined with per-user quotas on the tablespaces and per-user connection limits, I could create a new student user and be comfortable knowing they're not going to be able to steal from others nor consume all disk space. I didn't have to deal with CPU / memory based attacks on the box just 'cause I was lucky I guess. With postgres, I had to create a new database for each user (this was pre-schema, anyway), then tweak the hba conf file and sighup. I had no disk-based resource limits available to me (there's a creative use of linux loopback mounts to enforce per-database quotas floatin' around on the net somewhere, but I didn't think of that, as well as that probably wouldn't scale to, say, thousands of users). I wasn't about to dblink databases for 'em, so it ended up that the mass-student-consumption learn-SQL box was Oracle, and the lesser-used DB was postgres. So, finally, from the perspective of a college admin with a 'centralize the student services' mindset, being able to sandbox SQL users relatively easily while also being able to provide higher-level service such as cross-schema queries, centralized / guaranteed backup, etc. would have been fantastic using postgres. I don't work there anymore, but I'm sure other university shops still have the same issue to solve. If a tight schema sandbox isn't the default, then a system-catalog expert managed schema patch would have been greatly appreciated to solve at least the 'stay out of other user's crud by default' issues. ---- James Robinson Socialserve.com