Обсуждение: Regd. the Implementation of Wallet (in Oracle) config equivalent in postgreSQL whilst the database migration

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On Wed, 2022-12-21 at 04:48 +0000, Chetan Kosanam wrote:
> We are operating within one of the AWS business units ofTCS. Our team is working on
> the Database migration from Oracle(on Amazon EC2) to PostgreSQL. The reason for this
> e-mailer is to seek your earnest required support from you on theImplementation of
> Wallet configuration ( which is in Oracle) by its equivalent configuration on the
> PostgreSQL side.

There is no exact equivalent, but there is something similar and much better: you can
authenticate the client with SSL client certificates:
https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/auth-cert.html

Yours,
Laurenz Albe
-- 
Cybertec | https://www.cybertec-postgresql.com

What would you be missing? You can encrypt databases. You can encrypt the s3 buckets using kms. You can govern access via ssh Auth. When you do backups, you can encrypt the tar.gz files or whatever format and store it on s3. Same with the wal files. The fact that oracle charges for this is a joke. Of course, you would need to ensure compliance with your opsec teams and stuck with best security practices but it seems top to bottom encryption is unrelated or tangentially related to the databases.

Also, if you lose the encryption keys for your backups then bad things happen. I doubt what I did was production viable but I limited database access to a handful of users, encrypted the disks, left the Wal files unencrypted but mounted with read access for a single user, compressed full backups with encryption and a password, generated sah keys for anyone who needed service accounts to access the systems, enforced database ownership permissions, and and gave server access to a tiny team with 2fa. The way 8 figured it, if someone somehow rooted the box we were screwed anyway.

For an internal database, this seemed sufficient. For an external database, I would highly recommend paid consulting security firms or hire people who know to build an externally facing platform.

Thanks

Ben

On Wed, Dec 21, 2022, 4:39 PM Rainer Duffner <rainer@ultra-secure.de> wrote:

Am 21.12.2022 um 22:34 schrieb Laurenz Albe <laurenz.albe@cybertec.at>:

There is no exact equivalent, but there is something similar and much better: you can
authenticate the client with SSL client certificates:
https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/auth-cert.html

Isn’t the wallet the part where the encryption keys are stored?

Indeed, one of the few remaining features that only Oracle (and of course other commercial RDMSs) has seems to be full HSM support for TDE.

Rainer

What would you be missing? You can encrypt databases. You can encrypt the s3 buckets using kms. You can govern access via ssh Auth. When you do backups, you can encrypt the tar.gz files or whatever format and store it on s3. Same with the wal files. The fact that oracle charges for this is a joke. Of course, you would need to ensure compliance with your opsec teams and stuck with best security practices but it seems top to bottom encryption is unrelated or tangentially related to the databases.

Also, if you lose the encryption keys for your backups then bad things happen. I doubt what I did was production viable but I limited database access to a handful of users, encrypted the disks, left the Wal files unencrypted but mounted with read access for a single user, compressed full backups with encryption and a password, generated sah keys for anyone who needed service accounts to access the systems, enforced database ownership permissions, and and gave server access to a tiny team with 2fa. The way 8 figured it, if someone somehow rooted the box we were screwed anyway.

For an internal database, this seemed sufficient. For an external database, I would highly recommend paid consulting security firms or hire people who know to build an externally facing platform.

Thanks

Ben

On Wed, Dec 21, 2022, 4:39 PM Rainer Duffner <rainer@ultra-secure.de> wrote:

Am 21.12.2022 um 22:34 schrieb Laurenz Albe <laurenz.albe@cybertec.at>:

There is no exact equivalent, but there is something similar and much better: you can
authenticate the client with SSL client certificates:
https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/auth-cert.html

Isn’t the wallet the part where the encryption keys are stored?

Indeed, one of the few remaining features that only Oracle (and of course other commercial RDMSs) has seems to be full HSM support for TDE.

Rainer

On 2022-12-22 09:17:18 +0100, Rainer Duffner wrote:
>     Am 22.12.2022 um 00:57 schrieb Benedict Holland <
>     benedict.m.holland@gmail.com>:
>
>     If someone has root, I don't know how they also don't have your
>     encryption keys.
>
>
> They are not on the same box. They are in a HSM. A dedicated piece of
> tamper-proof hardware that stores secrets (keys).
> The Oracle-server needs to talk to the HSM to get the keys.

If the hacker has root access: What prevents them from talking to the
HSM?

        hp

--
   _  | Peter J. Holzer    | Story must make more sense than reality.
|_|_) |                    |
| |   | hjp@hjp.at         |    -- Charles Stross, "Creative writing
__/   | http://www.hjp.at/ |       challenge!"

On 2022-12-22 11:15:57 +0100, Rainer Duffner wrote:
>
>
>     Am 22.12.2022 um 10:46 schrieb Peter J. Holzer <hjp-pgsql@hjp.at>:
>
>     If the hacker has root access: What prevents them from talking to the
>     HSM?
>
>
>
> I wasn’t involved in setting it up here, but AFAIK you need to „enroll“ the
> client to the HSM.
>
> That is a one-time process that requires HSM credentials (via certificates and
> pass-phrases).
>
> Then, that client can talk to the HSM.

Which means that some sort of access-token is stored on the client.

So what prevents a hacker from using that access token?

> The HSM-client is (or should be) engineered in such a way that you can’t
> extract the encryption-secret easily.

Security by obscurity? Just hope that nobody figures out how that access
token is stored? That doesn't seem like a good strategy against
high-level threats.

        hp

--
   _  | Peter J. Holzer    | Story must make more sense than reality.
|_|_) |                    |
| |   | hjp@hjp.at         |    -- Charles Stross, "Creative writing
__/   | http://www.hjp.at/ |       challenge!"

TCS Confidential

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On 12/23/22 01:37, Chetan Kosanam wrote:
> TCS Confidential
> 
> 
> Hi *Support*@ *PostgreSQL* Team,
> 
> *Greetings* *!!*
> 
> **
> 
> **We are operating within one of the /AWS business/ units of *TCS*. Our 
> team is working on the *Database migration from Oracle(on Amazon EC2) to 
> PostgreSQL*. The reason for this e-mailer is to seek your earnest 
> required support from you on the *Alternative functionalities from 
> Oracle **à PostgreSQL* while migrating the Oracle database to PostgreSQL.

See here:

https://www.postgresql.org/support/professional_support/


-- 
Adrian Klaver
adrian.klaver@aklaver.com

On Wed, 2022-12-28 at 09:45 -0800, Adrian Klaver wrote:
> On 12/23/22 01:37, Chetan Kosanam wrote:
> > TCS Confidential
> >
> >
>
> See here:
>
> https://www.postgresql.org/support/professional_support/
>
>

Also there is ora2pg. See https://ora2pg.darold.net/

On 12/28/22 20:15, rob stone wrote:
>
> On Wed, 2022-12-28 at 09:45 -0800, Adrian Klaver wrote:
>> On 12/23/22 01:37, Chetan Kosanam wrote:
>>> TCS Confidential
>>>
>>>
>> See here:
>>
>> https://www.postgresql.org/support/professional_support/
>>
>>
> Also there is ora2pg. See https://ora2pg.darold.net/

That does a great job at data conversion.  Not sure about functionality 
conversion.

-- 
Born in Arizona, moved to Babylonia.

On Thu, Dec 22, 2022 at 11:15:57AM +0100, Rainer Duffner wrote:
> I wasn’t involved in setting it up here, but AFAIK you need to „enroll“ the
> client to the HSM.
> 
> That is a one-time process that requires HSM credentials (via certificates and
> pass-phrases).
> 
> Then, that client can talk to the HSM. 
> 
> The HSM-client is (or should be) engineered in such a way that you can’t
> extract the encryption-secret easily.
> 
> I am not sure, but IIRC, you should not even be able to clone the VM without
> the HSM noticing or the clone not working at all to begin with (for lack of
> enrollment). Though most production databases are too large to just „clone“.
> 
> Maybe someone who knows more about this subject can chime in before I make a
> fool of myself?

This wiki should help:

    https://wiki.postgresql.org/wiki/Transparent_Data_Encryption

Also, the first two patches in this email are doc patches which explain
the benefits:

    https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20210625212204.GA7256@momjian.us

-- 
  Bruce Momjian  <bruce@momjian.us>        https://momjian.us
  EDB                                      https://enterprisedb.com

Embrace your flaws.  They make you human, rather than perfect,
which you will never be.